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1 am currently a professor at the Graduate School of Governance Studies at 
Meiji University in Tokyo. Previously. 1 worked for thirty-six years in the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government. In 2000. when a series of volcanic eruptions 
threatened the island of Miyakejima. 1 was serving as vice-governor of Tokyo 
Metropolis. and 1 was appointed chief of Miyakejima on-site disaster 
management headquarters. In 2011， after the earthquake and tsunami that 
devastated northeastern J apan， 1 helped coordinate assistance to victims as an 
officer ofthe Tokyo Volunteer Network for Disaster Relief. Today 1 would like 
to draw on these experiences to compare the 2000 Miyakejima eruption and the 
2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. 
Clearly， the Miyakejima disaster in 2000 was caused by a volcanic eruption. 
The 2011 disaster in northeastern Japan， on the other hand. was mainly the 
result of a tsunami triggered by an earthquake. 
But even though the two disasters differed in cause and scale，出eyoffer 
similar lessons in terms of minimizing casualties from natural disasters. So let 
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us comp紅 ethe two from this perspective. 
The to1 from the 2011 Great East ]apan Earthquake was recently put at 18， 
716 dead or missing. The death to1 from the 2000 Miyakejima eruption was 
zero. 
Was it better disaster prediction that made the difference? The answer is 
no. 
The total evacuation of Miyakejima in September 2000 came in the midst of 
a series of violent eruptions that had been going on for two months after 
authorities had initialy declared the island safe. 
A newspaper articIe from ]une 30， 2000， reported that Miyakejima had been 
decIared safe. It was only natural for the newspapers to report this， since the 
] apanese government had announced that it was safe to return to the island. In 
fact， al of Japan's major news outlets treated the safety decIaration as a top 
news story 
Unfortunately， a series of violent volcanic eruptions began soon afterwards. 
This situation continued for about two months before the island was五nally
evacua民d.Nonetheless， there were no casualties. How can we explain that? 
One reason it is doubtless出atboth the residents of Miyakejima and出e
Tokyo Metropolitan Government， where 1 served， were used to dealing with 
volcanic eruptions. For example， the 1983 Miyakejima eruption， seventeen years 
earIier， had buried a village of about 400 households in a lava f1ow. The entire 
village was buried. But there were no fatalities on this occasion， either. 
Obviously，出atwas because everyone had been evacuated on time 
During my years with the Tokyo Metropolitan Government， we 
experienced three major volcanic eruptions: the 1983 and 2000 eruptions on 
Miyakejima， with a population of approximately 4，000， and the 1986 eruption on 
Oshima， another island wi出 apopulation of about 9，000. Tokyo is a modern city， 
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but no one can administer Tokyo Metropolis without knowing how to cope wi出
active volcanoes. 
Miyakejima is a full180 kilometers from mainland Tokyo and 32 kilometers 
from the neighboring island of Mikurashima. In such a locale， one understands 
the importance of a swift evacuation. 
By contrast， the disaster of March 2011 was something no one in J apan had 
anticipated. 
First of al， the earthquake hit northeastem J apan. In J apan， we are required 
by law to prepare for a massive earthquake， but the law assumes出atsuch an 
earthquake will be centered to the south of Tokyo， inthe Tokai， Nankai， or 
Tonankai regions. However the March 2011 ev'ent did not occur in these 
regl.Ons. 
Second， the 2011 earthquake was a magnitude 9.0 quake-larger than 
anything the J apanese had anticipated. 
Third， the source of the disaster was a tsunami， and most of the deaths were 
by drowning. By contrast， in the Great Kanto Earthquake that devastated 
Tokyo in 1923，五resaccounted for most of the fatalities， and in the Great 
HanshinE町thqu出ethat hit Kobe in 1995， most of the victims were crushed by 
collapsing buildings or falling 0 bjects. J apanese 0宜icialshad never anticipated a 
tsunami of this magnitude. 
The focal region of the Great East J apan Earthquake covered a huge 
e玄P血 seof northeastem J apan， an area about 500 kilometers long. 
Experts had predicted an earthquake would eventually hit of the coast of 
Miyagi Prefecture， but the March 2011 quake was of a completely different 
order. 
However， the Japan Meteorological Agency initialy reported the March 
2011 event as a magnitude 7.9 quake. It was only two days later that they 
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revised出atto 9.0. The early observational data released to the public reported 
a 20-centimeter wave at Kamaishi in Iwate Prefecture and a 50-centimeter 
wave at Ishinomaki in Miyagi Prefecture. This referred to the :first wave to hit. 
But at its peak， the tsunami reached more白血10times the height of也e五rst
wave in some locations. These early reports may have given people a false 
sense of security and taken some of the momentum out of evacuation e百Orts.It
is possible也ata failure to grasp the ful magnitude of the earthquake at the 
outset contributed to the slow pace of evacuation. 
Maximum heights for the tsunami of March 2011， as issued by the Japan 
Meteorological Agency， included the following local readings: 
Aomori Prefecture 
Hachinohe 
Miyagi Prefecture 
Onagawa 
Minamisanriku 
Sendaiport 
1 wate Prefecture 
Ofunato 
Kamaishi 
Fukushima Prefecture 
8.4m 
17.6m 
15.4m 
14.4m 
9.5m 
9.0m 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plarit 14.0 m 
Flooding from the tsunami covered approximately 500 square kilometers of 
land spanning Aomori， 1 wate， Miyagi， Fukushima， and Ibaraki Prefectures. It 
inundated inland as well as coastal areas， traveling some 50 km up出eKital四 m
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River， for example. 
The most heavily flooded urban areas， by the percentage of land inundated， 
were as follows: 
Higashimatsushima， 1 wate Prefecture 
Otsuchi， Iwate Prefecture 
Minamisanriku， Miyagi Prefecture 
Ishinomaki， Miyagi Prefecture 
Yamamoto， Miyagi Prefecture 
63% 
50% 
48% 
46% 
46% 
At Shiogama port in Sendai， the tsunami measured 7.2 meters at its peak. 
Within Sendai's city limits， the tsunami flooded 4，633 hectares. About 250，000 of 
the municipa1ity's 530，000 homes were damaged or destroyed in the disaster. 
Some 105，000 residents took refuge in 288 shelters， and the tol mounted to 921 
dead or missing. This far exceeded anything oficials had planned for， since the 
maximum impact envisioned from a Miyagi (magnitude 8.0 sequential rupture) 
earthquake was 28，000 homes destroyed and 57-87 dead. 
In fact， the 1978 Miyagi earthquake (magnitude 7.2) had generated an 
lかcentimetertsunami and 18 fatalities. This earthquake and its impact were 
也ebasis for the subsequent revision of the Building Standards Act. which lead 
to more rigorous construction standards for earthquake resistance nationwide. 
But the impact of the March 2011 tsunami was clearly far beyond anything 
J apanese experts and 0血cialshad envisioned. 
Many people were able to save themselves by fleeing to high ground. But 
many others died because they had no idea such a massive tsunami was coming. 
Many people in J apan are engaged in serious soul-searching， asking how the 
major broadcast media services could do a better job saving lives. 
How do these lessons from the 2011 earthquake and apply to volcanic 
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eruptions? 
Large helicopters must be available to help people evacuate. Smaller 
helicopters are needed as well. For evacuating an island， large passenger ships 
are essential. But smaller fishing boats can also be used to aid evacuation. 
Islands need to be eq叫ppedwi出 piers.
Equipment for stopping lava丑owsmust be transported to the disaster area as 
wel1. Volcanic eruptions can trigger landslides， mudslides， and debris flows. 
Fallout of volcanic ash can cause further damage. Large sabo dams may have to 
be built at multiple sites to stop mudslides and debris flows. On Miyakejima， 
more than 50 dams of this sort were built. As a result， people were able to 
return to the island even though volcanic activity was continuing. Mudflow 
channels are also an important means of control1ing debris flows. But no amount 
of dam construction or special equipment can withstand nature's fury at its 
worst. 
J apan passed the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Law in 1961. When the 
Ise Bay Typhoon of 1959 cIaimed more than 5，000 lives， people asked why， in
this day and age， a typhoon should cause so many casualties when it had been 
forecast weII in advance. In response， the new law placed top priority on 
evacuation. It also put municipalities in charge of evacuation efforts on the 
assumption that local authorities are best acquainted with p田tdisasters in the 
紅白肌dlocal topography. The idea is to apply出elessons of the past. 
The eruptions on Miyakejima led to the complete evacuation of the island for 
a period of four and a half years. Smal1-scale volcanic activity continues even 
now， but thanks to the construction of a large number of sabo netaining wall dams， 
it was possible to日tthe evacuation order and allow the residents to return. 
The Shinmyou-ike pond on Miyakejima was created by a volcanic eruption 
about 2000 years ago. The banks of也epond provide habitat for many small 
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creatures. No matter how often the Miyakejima volcano erupts， the inhabitants 
always return. All over the world， one sees examples of communities coexisting 
Wl出 activevolcanoes. 
This brings us to my conclusions. Crises are always unforeseen events. We 
can never rely solely on high-tech construction and equipment to protect 
people's lives. Prompt evacuation is of the essence. As long as residents escape 
with their lives，也eycan always return home eventually. For this reason it is 
vital to provide residents with meaningful and timely information. Faster 
communication of information means fewer casualties.' 
For our society as a whole， the五rsttask is to improve the quality of science 
education. What are volcanoes? What are earthquakes? What are typhoons? 
When people understand the underlying mechanism， and not just the superficial 
facts， they know what to do to escape quickly. The second task is to improve our 
ability to provide information in an emergency. And the third is to build al the 
infrastructure needed to facilitate evacuation. 
These are the key lessons to be learned from a comparison of the 2000 
volcanic eruption on Miyakejima and the 2011 Great East J apan Earthquake. 
2. The 2011 Tsunami and the Evolution of Crisis Management 
Crisis management is the way people and organizations handle unlikely but 
dangerous situations， and proper handling of such situations is impossible 
without precautions and preparations. For this reason， people in the field of 
crisis management envision a wide range of possible scenarios， which they use 
to conduct simulations and drils. But actual emergencies almost never fal 
within the scope of those anticipated scenarios. We cal them emergencies 
precisely because they're unanticipated. To deal with a situation that fals neatly 
within the scope of our assumptions血 dpredictions， we need only follow the 
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manual. That's not a real emergency. and its handling isn't real crisis 
management. 
The purpose of precautions and preparedness in crisis management is to 
minimize the unanticipated-in other words. to reduce the magnitude of也e
emergency. We carry out simulations and drils on the basis of various scenarios 
in the hope that doing so wil enable us to respond more appropriately and 
e百'ectivelywhen the unanticipated occurs. 
This is why it's important to promote the evolution of crisis management by 
identifying shortcomings in our response to actual emergencies and formulating 
better precautions and preparations for emergencies that could occur in由e
h加re.Although the Great East J apan Earthquake was an unprecedented 
disaster from J apan's standpoint， one wonders how much也atexperience has 
contributed to the evolution of crisis management in this country. 
As communities rebuild in the wake of the March 2011 tsunami， they have 
deliberated on a wide range of measures geared to preventing similar disasters 
in出efu白re，including relocation to higher ground， reinforcement of levees and 
floodgates. and construction of tsunami evacuation buildings. and some of these 
ideas are being implemented. All over J apan， local governments have been 
revising their assumptions about the risks from earthquakes and tsunami and 
reworking their disaster management plans. In addition to the reinforcement of 
coastal barriers and f100dgates to protect against tsunami， some are taking 
steps to prevent soil liquefaction in the event of earthquakes. In major urban 
areas， the focus is on measures to improve the earthquake resistance of 
structures and slow the spread of fire in densely developed areas and along 
major highways. Local governments and citizens nationwide have helped with 
the rehabilitation of the disaster areas. These efforts continue even now. 
Manyspec凶cimprovements have been implemented or are under way. But 
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in the past， major disasters in J apan have always led to clear-cut policies 
designed to supply what was missing in our response. So far， this has not 
emerged. 
The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995， also known as the Kobe 
earthquake， led first of al to the establishment of an emergency management 
system at the national and local levels. Although there is stil much room for 
improvement， the system at least instilled an awareness出attop government 
executives must play the leading role in any emergency response. The second 
legacy of the Kobe earthquake was the 1998 NPO Act， or Act to Promote 
Spec正iedNonprofit Activities， which came about because of the pivotal role 
volunteer groups played in disaster relief after the 1995 quake. The third was 
the 1998 Act Concerning Support for Reconstructing the Livelihood of Disaster 
Victims， which established a fund to provide up to 1 million yen per household to 
those who have lost their homes in natural disasters. (That was revised to 2 
million following the Chuetsu Earthquake.) The first beneficiaries of this fund 
were people evacuated from Miyakejima during the volcanic eruptions of 2000. 
In fact， virtually every major disaster modern J apan has suffered has led to a 
new framework for disaster preparedness and emergency response. The 
Disaster Relief Act of 1947， a response to the large number of casualties from 
typhoons in the wake of W orld War I， made provision for shelters， temporary 
housing， and basic supplies. In 1961. after more than 5，000 people died in the 
1959 Ise Bay Typhoon， J apan passed the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act， 
which made mayors and other top municipal executives responsible for issuing 
evacuatioロadvisoriesand orders， among other things. The 1923 Great Kanto 
Earthquake provided the impetus for the rebirth of Tokyo as a modern city. 
What will the legacy of the Great East Japan Earthquake be? How will this 
experience contribute to the evolution of Japan's emergency management 
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system? Now is the time for a meaningful， broad~based debate on this crucial 
pomt. 
1 was attending a meeting in the Otemachi district of Tokyo on March 11， 
2011， the day of the Great East J apan Earthquake. When the earthquake hit. the 
meeting was cut short. so 1 walked back to my ofice at Meiji University in 
Ochanomizu， arriving about 15 minutes later. Aftcr tuning in to get the latest 
news on the radio and the Internet. 1 began making cals about canceling an 
event 1 had helped organized for that evening， inwhich about 80 people were to 
travel by ship to the island of Niijima. The phone service was on and of， but 
eventually 1 got in touch with the other organizers， and they al agreed that the 
event should be canceled. After that. 1 contacted a few seismologists. They had 
various comments to offer， but the bottom line was that they really di血'tknow
what had happened at that point. 
The news media were initialy reporting an earthquake of magnitude 8. 
That would have made it slightly more powerful白血 the1923 Tokyo 
e町出qu北e，which was magnitude 7.9. A bit later， Internet sites began showing 
footage of the tsunami. Later， in出eevening， the television stations began 
broadcasting images of the fires that had broken out because of the tsunami. 
Finally， we learned that the earthquake had actually been magnitude 9-in 
other words， about 40 times more powerful th叩 the1923 Tokyo earthquake. 
One reason some communities didn't receive tsunami warnings in time to 
evacuate may have been that the magnitude of the quake was underestimated 
by a fador of about 40. 
J apanese law mandates a wide array of measures to protect from massive 
earthquakes centered in areas that experts agree are vulnerable to such events. 
Until now， those areas have been the Tokai， Nankai，担dTonankai regions south 
of Tokyo. The Act on Special Measures Conceming Countermeasures for 
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Large-Scale Earthquakes was enacted in 1978 to protect against a massive 
Tokai earthquake. But in the thirty-odd years since出en，Japan has been 
through a Hanshin-Awaji earthquake， a Fukuoka earthquake， two Chuetsu 
earthquakes， and most recently a Great East Japan earthquake-everything 
but the kind of earthquakes envisioned by our disaster preparedn回slaws. 
All this has made me keenly aware of how litle our scientists and engineers 
really know. When oficials explained the poor response to the March 2011 
disaster by saying no one had planned for such an event， some people got very 
indignant and demanded to know why not. But I see出isas an important and 
humbling reminder that human scienti五cknowledge stil has a long， long way to 
go. 
My own experience a decade earlier taught me how poorly 0町 experts
understand what is going on beneath the surface of the J apanese archipelago. In 
J une 2000， magma began moving underground on the volcanic island of 
Miyakejima， which is under the jurisdiction of Tokyo Metropolitan Government. 
The island was shaken by a swarm of seismic tremors as magma began moving 
beneath the eastern portion of the island. About 2，000 people living on出atpart 
of Miyakejima were evacuated to the north quadrant because of concerns about 
a fissure eruption on the eastern side. Soon afterward， observations indicated 
that magma had migrated beneath Mount Oyama to the western side of the 
island， and a submarine eruption was recorded to the northwest. The panel of 
senior academics that's always convened on these occasions decided that也e
energy had been released and the danger was past. They declared the island 
safe because， asthey put it， itwas crystal clear where the magma had migrated. 
As vice-governor in charger of disaster prevention for the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government， I was on the scene at the time， and I questioned the 
wisdom of the safety declaration. The area was stil experiencing repeat疋d
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tremors of about intensity 5 on the ]MA scale， which suggested that magma 
was stil migrating. And in fact， experts outside也isselect panel who had been 
following出eseismological data were dumbfounded to he紅 thatthe island had 
been declared safe. 
At也attime there were also several hundred members of the press 
assembled on Miyakejima， drawn in part by the prospect of capturing some 
dramatic footage of volcanic activity. Some of them may have learned a bit of 
science in school， but my impression was也atmost of them hadn't been paying 
attention during clas. One of them actually approached me to ask if the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Govemment was capable of preventing an eruption. At a press 
conference on the island， some reporters openly speculated that we had delayed 
releasing the panel's safety declaration to give the governor time to arrive on 
the island， and that insinuation found its way into the media's news coverage. 
Not long afterward， the magma that the panel of senior academics had been 
so certain no longer posed a risk erupted from Mount Oyama repeatedly， with 
such force that the ash fel more than 500 kilometers away in Niigata 
Prefecture， and concentrations of sulfur dioxide rose in excess of environmental 
standards 200 kilometers away in Hachioji. Two months later， the entire island 
was finally evacuated， and the islanders were unable to return home for four 
and a half years， in2005. 
The truth is出atwe human beings have almost no idea what is happening 
under the ground beneath our feet. We've brought back soil and rock samples 
from outer space， but we have yet to explore more出an10 kilometers or so 
beneath the surface of the earth. We understand far less about the interior of 
our own planet出血wedo about outer space. 
There is no use generating electricity unless you can connect to it using 
electric cables. This is something we learn at school in science lab. Transmission 
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and distribution actually cost more出回 generation.Yet in ] apan some have 
simplistically called for a reduction in the wheeling charges third-party 
producers pay for access to the transmission and distribution grid. arguing that 
this would allow more power to be generated and lower electricity costs. They 
haven't given any thought to where the power plants wil be built or who is 
going to pay for construction and maintenance of the transmission and 
distribution grid. These days. you really need some knowledge of science just to 
engage in meaningful economic debate. 
This is why we need to put more emphasis on science education. That may 
sound strange coming from someone who only received a bachelor's degree in 
law and a doctorate in political science. but 1 believe that one important lesson 
humanity should take away from the tragedy of March 1. 2011 is the 
rudimentary state of our scienti五cknowledge. We need to be more humble in 
the face of nature's destructive power. 
3. Preparing for the Eruption 01 Mount Fuji 
Professor Toshitsugu F吋i.head of the ]MA's VoIcanic Eruption Prediction 
Panel. recently warned that Mount Fuji could erupt in the not-too-distant 
future. Local governments in the Tokyo area should move quickly to prepare 
for such a contingency. 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government knows al too well the potential of 
volcanic ash to disrupt urban functions. thanks to its experience with the 
massive volcanic eruptions that took place on Miyakejima in 2000. Altogether. 
the series of eruptions generated a huge amount of ash fall. When volcanic ash 
accumulates on roads. vehicles skid and spin their wheels and are unable to get 
up inclines. A layer of volcanic ash settling on Tokyo would make any roads 
with a significant incline unusable. just as in a major snowstorm. That would 
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mean overpasses and expressway r出npswould have to be closed. And the 
effect on transportation isn't limited to roads. Volcanic ash can also bring 
commuter trains to a halt through its impact on仕acksand signal systems. 
In many cases， the ash企omvo1canic eruptions is so light that a breeze is 
enough to stir it up. Since this ash can damage 1ungs and airways， peop1e need to 
wear high-efficiency dust masks when wa1king around outdoors. And when an 
eruption produces toxic gas， as the Miyakejima eruption did， they need 
respirators equipped with the right type of fi1ter for those gases before 
venturing outside. 
V olcanic ash can seep into buildings through the cracks and make e1ectronic 
equipment and devices unusab1e. It can also affect the operation of the e1ectric 
power and te1ecommunications equipment mounted on ut出typo1es. In this way 
it can paralyze the systems that support a city's urban functions and dai1y 
activities. Peop1e wou1d not be ab1e to go on 1iving in that city unti1 the ash had 
stopped fal1ing and the functions had been restored. 
Vo1canic ash itse1f is light， but when it rains， itabsorbs water and becomes 
heavy. This can resu1ts in wood-frame houses collapsing under the weight of 
the ash that has built up on their rooftops. With typhoon season approaching on 
Miyakejima， vo1unteers gathered from a1 over ]apan. together with 
Se1f-Defense personnel， to remove the ash from the roofs of is1anders' homes. 
In Miyakejima's case， the entire is1and had to be evacuated for a period of 
four and a half years. What made such a 10ng evacuation necessary was not just 
the danger of ongoing eruptions but the need to rebuild the is1and's 
infrastructure and 1ife1ines， which had been damaged or destroyed by ash and 
debris. Before the residents cou1d return. the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
had to bui1d dozens of 1arge-sca1e dams and containment wal1s on the is1and to 
prevent further muds1ides.1andslides. and debris flows caused by vo1canic ash. 
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Mount Fuji is not the only volcano that we need to worry about. The 
volcanoes on Miyakejima and Izu Oshima have erupted at intervals over the 
centuries and will continue to do so. A volcanic eruption on Kozushima in the 
ninth century made its impact felt as far away as western J apan. And people in 
eastern J apan live on top of a thick layer of ash deposited by the massive 
eruption of the Aira volcano in the Kagoshima area of Kyushu thousands of 
years ago. Volcanic ash from the 2010 volcanic eruptions in Iceland disrupted air 
travel over much of Europe. The impact from volcanic ash can spread over a 
very wide訂 ea.
Tokyo Metropolis has quite a few volcanic islands under its jurisdiction. and 
it has 21 active volcanoes-more than釦 yother prefecture in J apan. and surely 
more than any other comparable administrative entity in the world. When you 
work for the Tokyo Metropolitan Government for more than 30 years. as 1 did. 
you are bound to have multiple encounters with volcanic eruptions. 
In 1983. when lava from an eruption buried about 400 homes on Miyakejima. 
I was involved in the relocation of residents out of high-risk areas as阻 0出cial
in the Bureau of Planning. In 1986. when the island of Oshima was evacuated. 1 
helped administer aid to the victims as head of general affairs in the Bureau of 
Citizens and Cultural Affairs. In 2000. when the eruptions on Miyakejima led to 
that island's evacuation. 1 went back and forth between the mainland and the 
island about 70 times as vice-governor and chief of on-site disaster 
management headquarters. 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government and those who have worked with it 
have a wealth of practical expertise when it comes to minimizing the impact of 
volcanic eruptions. We should put that knowledge to use in establishing 
procedures and policies to protect the functions and inhabitants of our cities 
from the dangers of volcanic ash fall. 
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